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ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
Sheara Gelman*
I. INTRODUCTION
As most California attorneys are aware, the issues of pro-
fessional responsibility and attorney discipline have been
hotly debated in the past several years. The State Bar of
California ("State Bar") has come under tremendous scrutiny
leading to a funding crisis and much criticism.! Although the
State Bar's shutdown happened two years ago,2 its impact is
still being felt in this year's ethics developments. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's intervention into the state's attorney
discipline system marked a trend toward continuing control
over attorneys and their activities. While the American Bar
Association ("ABA") seems to be relaxing the standards
regulating attorneys,3 the State Bar and state courts have is-
sued decisions that reaffirm the reach of regulations affecting
attorneys.4
Part II of this review briefly examines the pivotal Cali-
fornia Supreme Court case of In re Attorney Discipline Sys-
* Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of Maryland, College
Park.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
3. For example, the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice has
recommended relaxing the restrictions on fee sharing with non-lawyers in order
to allow lawyers and non-lawyers to form partnerships. See infra Part III.B.
4. Compare ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the
House of Delegates, (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ mdpre-
commendation.html> (recommending that lawyers be allowed to deliver legal
services through a multidisciplinary practice and share fees with non-lawyers)
[hereinafter ABA Comm'n on MDP, Report to House of Delagates], with State
Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal
Op. 1999-154 (1999) (opining that to the extent a lawyer performs legal services,
he or she is prohibited from sharing fees with a non-lawyer).
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tern5 that provided emergency funding for the State Bar.6
Part III examines the advisory opinions of the State Bar of
California Committee on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct and compares those opinions to national trends.'
Part IV looks at California cases that have impacted the rules
of professional responsibility.8 Finally, Part V examines the
ABA's activities including the advisory opinions it has is-
sued.9 Although not exhaustive, these sources highlight the
most important ethical issues affecting California attorneys
in 1999.
II. CONFLICT OVER THE CALIFORNIA STATE BAR REACHES THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
The State Bar of California, created by statute in 1927, is
traditionally funded by fee assessments imposed by the leg-
islature on attorneys licensed to practice in the state. ' By
statute the State Bar is authorized to collect $77 in annual
dues from attorneys; however, only $27 of that may be used
for the attorney discipline system." In 1997, then-Governor
Pete Wilson vetoed a bill that would have increased the an-
nual dues to $458.12 In 1998 the California Legislature ad-
journed without passing a fee bill." Feeling its current
funding for an attorney discipline system inadequate, the
State Bar petitioned the California Supreme Court to impose
a special fee assessment in order to properly fund the disci-
pline system. 4
After concluding that an attorney discipline system is es-
sential to protect the public"5 and that the current system was
5. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49 (Cal. 1998).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.A-C.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 52.
11. Forty dollars is expressly allocated by statute to the Client Security
Fund and its administration, while $10 is reserved for either staff facilities or
major capital improvements. See id. at 53.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 53. The State Bar continued to be authorized by statute to
collect $77 in annual dues. See id.
14. See id. at 51.
15. See id. at 65. The court found that "the objective of the discipline sys-
tem is not punishment of the attorney, but protection of the public." Id. Some
have argued that a separate discipline system is not necessary because the
1220 [Vol. 40
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inadequate,'6 the court exercised its inherent powers and im-
posed a special fee assessment.17 Rejecting the argument that
court action would violate separation of powers'8 the court
found that when the legislature has not acted, the court "ap-
propriately may decide to take action to avert a shutdown of
the disciplinary system.""
Although the court's decision is by no means unique,20 it
highlights the court's commitment to professional responsi-
bility by ensuring that the attorney discipline system prop-
erly functions to protect the public. In the background of
each ethics-related decision is the notion that:
[an unregulated profession soon may lose its right to call
itself a profession, as public doubts about the fairness of
the practice of law and of the courts increase. The courts
suffer not only as such doubts in the integrity of the pro-
fession and the legal system grow, but suffer also because
the courts rightfully may be considered responsible when
public has recourse, in the form of civil and criminal remedies, for abuses com-
mitted by attorneys. See id. However, the court noted that "society has found
that the regulation of various professions through licensing is an essential com-
panion to the relief available through civil and criminal litigation." Id. at 66.
Leaving the civil and criminal justice systems as the only recourse for injured
clients would encourage litigation, increase the burden on courts, and would not
prevent future abuses. See id. at 65.
16. Without a fee bill, the State Bar is only authorized to allocate $27 to-
wards a discipline system. See Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 53. The
court found that this was inadequate, as evidenced by the mounting backlog of
complaints. See id. at 52.
17. See id. at 77 ("Each active member shall pay a mandatory regulatory fee
of one hundred seventy-three dollars ($173) to the Special Master's Attorney
Discipline Fund .... This $173 assessment is in addition to the mandatory fees
currently authorized by statute.").
18. Governor Wilson argued that because the State Bar was created by
statute and since funding was traditionally provided for by the legislature, the
court did not have the power to assess fees in order to provide a discipline sys-
tem. See id. at 55. While recognizing that the State Bar has traditionally been
regulated by the legislature, the court stated, "[O]ur traditional respect of leg-
islative regulation of the practice of law, based upon principles of comity and
pragmatism, is not to be viewed as an abdication of our inherent responsibility
and authority over the core functions of admission and discipline of attorneys."
Id. at 62.
19. Id. at 64. In reaching this decision, the court rejected Governor Wilson's
argument that by providing for funding the court was substituting its judgment
for that of the legislature. See id. at 70.
20. Other states considering this issue reached the same conclusion. See,
e.g., Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949); In re Integra-
tion of Bar of Haw., 432 P.2d 887 (Haw. 1967); Board of Overseers of Bar v. Lee,
422 A.2d 998 (Me. 1980); Matter of Miss. State Bar, 361 So. 2d 503 (Miss. 1978).
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they fail to act to protect the public despite their authority
to do so. Thus, the interests of the public, the legal system,
and the courts all benefit from the existence of a function-
ing and effective attorney disciplinary system.2
III. ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT
The State Bar of California Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct ("Committee") issues advisory
opinions in response to questions posed by attorneys that im-
plicate issues of professional responsibility. These opinions
are non-binding. This year, the Committee issued two formal
opinions and one interim opinion.
A Simultaneous Representation of a Corporation and a
Shareholder in an Action Brought by Another
Shareholder: Formal Opinion 1999-1532
In Formal Opinion 1999-153, the Committee addressed
the potential conflict of interest a corporate attorney faces
when dealing with a small corporation. Under the facts pre-
sented the Committee decided that a lawyer might represent
both the corporation and a shareholder in an action brought
by another shareholder."
1. Facts
The corporation was comprised of two shareholders, A
and B.2 Shareholder A served as president and CEO with the
power to oversee daily operations. 5 A was also authorized to
obtain legal counsel for the corporation and oversee that rep-
resentation.26
A and B were in disagreement over business matters.
Unable to resolve the dispute, B filed a lawsuit against both
the corporation and A individually. 8 A hired an attorney to
21. Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 66 (emphasis added).
22. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999).
1222 [Vol. 40
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represent both A and the corporation in the lawsuit.29 The at-
torney had never represented the corporation before this mat-
ter.3"
2. Discussion
The facts presented raise a number of issues. First, may
the attorney represent both the corporation and shareholder
A?3 Generally, a lawyer representing a corporation does not
represent the individual shareholders." This fact is reinforced
by Rule 3-600 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct
which states, "Filn representing an organization, a member
shall conform his or her representation to the concept that
the client is the organization itself, acting through its highest
authorized officer, employee, body or constituent overseeing
the particular engagement." Because a corporate counsel's
primary duty is to the corporation, California courts have
held that counsel should not get involved in disputes between
shareholders ."
At first glance, the attorney's representation of A in a
dispute with B is in violation of Rule 3-600. However, the at-
torney representing the corporation must follow the instruc-
tions of the highest officer authorized to oversee the corpora-
tion, which in this case is A.3' In this limited situation, the
attorney may represent both A and the corporation, provided
that the two do not have conflicting interests 36 and that the
attorney only takes action in the lawful interest of the corpo-
ration.37 It is no problem that during the course of represen-
tation the corporate counsel will take action adverse to a
shareholder, in this case B, because "a lawyer is not prohib-
ited from taking actions on behalf of the corporation that
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1991); Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
33. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600(A) (1999).
34. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda
Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327 (Ct. App. 1995); Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 627;
Woods v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1983).
35. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999).
36. See id.
37. See id. at n.4.
122320001
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negatively impact the interests of a shareholder or other con-
stituents."38 Further, by bringing a lawsuit against the corpo-
ration, B is not entitled to representation by the corporate
counsel in connection with the suit.39
Having resolved that the attorney may represent both A
and the corporation, the second issue is whether the attorney
needs the informed written consent of both. Because the at-
torney will represent two distinct clients, Rule 3-310(c)(1) and
(2) apply." Under the facts presented, informed written con-
sent will be required if B or another person obtains control of
the corporation" or if it is reasonably possible that the attor-
ney may need to reveal confidential information to someone
other than A."
The third issue concerns who can consent on behalf of the
38. Id. See also Skarbrevik, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 627; Meehan v. Hopps, 301
P.2d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
39. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999).
40. See id. The rule states:
A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each cli-
ent:
(1) accept representation of more than one client in a matter in
which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or
(2) accept or continue representation of more than one client in a
matter in which the interest of the clients actually conflict; or
(3) represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a sepa-
rate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in
the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310(C) (1999).
41. This triggers the possibility that the attorney could receive conflicting
instructions from the corporation and from A. See State Bar of California
Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-153
(1999).
42. See id. The opinion identifies six situations that create conflict when
representing multiple clients:
(1) conflicting instructions of the clients in which the lawyer cannot
follow one client's instruction without violating another client's instruc-
tion; (2) conflicting objectives of the clients in which the lawyer cannot
effectively advance on client's objective without detrimentally affecting
another client's objective; (3) advocacy of antagonistic position of the
clients in which the lawyer is called on to advocate both sides of a nego-
tiation or a legal position at the same time; (4) inconsistent expecta-
tions of a confidentiality in which one client expects the lawyer not to
disclose information the lawyer would be required to impart to the
other client; (5) a preexisting relationship with one client that would
adversely affect the lawyer's independent judgment on behalf of the
other client; and (6) conflicting demands by the clients for the original
file once the representation has ended.
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corporation if a potential conflict of interest does arise. This
question is governed in part by Rule 3-600(E), which states:
A member representing an organization may also repre-
sent any of its directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the provi-
sions of rule 3-310. If the organization's consent to the
dual representation is required by rule 3-310, the consent
shall be given by an appropriate constituent of the organi-
zation other than the individual of constituent who is to be
represented, or by the shareholder(s) or organization
members.48
Thus, consent, if necessary, can be given either by a con-
stituent other than the one being represented or by a share-
holder.4 The rule gives no indication as to which sharehold-
ers can give consent and there is no limitation that it must be
a shareholder other than the one being represented. The
committee said, "at a minimum, the shareholder or share-
holders must have sufficient authority to execute an agree-
ment to the joint representation for the corporation.'S
Under the facts presented, the Committee believed it was
unreasonable to require B's consent since that would allow an• 4 1
opposing party to dictate who can represent the corporation.
A could consent because he is the only other shareholder, and
as the president of the corporation A was authorized to hire
and oversee corporate counsel."
3. Conclusion
Under the narrow facts presented the Committee decided
that the attorney may represent both A and the corporation
in the action brought by B.4' The Committee cautioned that
there may be circumstances where the controlling sharehold-
ers owe the minority shareholders a fiduciary duty that would
prevent A from seeking joint representation.49 Also, this case
does not concern a shareholder derivative action, which would
43. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600(E) (1999).
44. See id.
45. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.; see also, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal.
1969).
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implicate different policy concerns."
B. Advertising Legal Skills to Market Non-Legal Services:
Formal Opinion 1999-154'
The issue of multi-disciplinary practice ("MDP") is a hot
topic in today's legal community. The ABA defines an MDP
as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other associa-
tion or entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and
has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal
services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that
holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well
as legal, services."'
The legal community has been paying close attention to
MDPs as more and more alliances have been created between
law firms and "Big Five accounting firms"53 and as many ex-
perienced lawyers have been leaving U.S. firms in order to
join MDPs operating abroad.54 The ABA noticed this trend
and its Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice ("Commis-
sion") recommended that the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct be revised to allow lawyers to deliver legal services
through MDPs and to share fees with non-lawyers.5
Unlike the ABA, the State Bar of California Committee
on Professional Responsibility and Conduct has shown no
50. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-153 (1999).
51. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999).
52. ABA Comm'n on MDP, Report to House of Delagates, supra note 4.
53. See ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Updated Background
and Informational Reports and Request for Comments (visited Feb. 8, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>. For example, law firms Morrison &
Foerster and Horwood, Marcus & Berk have entered into a strategic alliance
with KPGM. See id. In addition, Bingham Dana, LLP has merged its money-
management practice with Legg Mason, Inc., in what is reported as "the first
partnership between a law firm and an asset management firm in the United
States." Id.
54. See ABA Comm'n on MDP, Report to House of Delagates, supra note 4.
MDPs are gaining acceptance abroad. The first steps toward approving MDPs
have been taken in Great Britain; legislation has been passed in Australia to
allow law firms to incorporate and share profits with non-lawyers; and the In-
ternational Practice Law Committee of the Canadian Bar Association has rec-
ommended that lawyers be permitted to enter into partnerships and share fees
with non-lawyers. See id.
55. See infra Part V.
1226 [Vol. 40
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signs of relaxing the standards governing dual practitioners
who share fees with non-lawyers." In Formal Opinion 1999-
154, the Committee considered the extent to which a lawyer
may advertise his or her legal skills to market non-legal
services and concluded that the rules of professional conduct
apply, notwithstanding the non-legal nature of the business.57
The Committee also decided that while receiving a commis-
sion for referring clients to an investment manager was not
an impermissible fee sharing, it did create a financial interest
to constitute a business transaction with a client. 8
1. Facts
Attorney A wished to create a business that offered in-
vestment advisory services. 9 As part of her business A would
identify the investment needs and objectives of her clients, re-
fer clients to a portfolio manager and in some cases directly
manage the portfolio herself." If A referred a client's portfolio
to an investment manager, she would receive a fee from the
manager based on a percentage of the value of the portfolio.61
A anticipated that she might give "incidental legal ad-
vice" to her clients relating to the investment process, but
would not charge an additional fee for this advice." When cli-
ents needed help preparing legal documents A would refer
them to another attorney. However, A would review the
documents and advise the clients about them.63
A would market herself solely as an investment advisor,
but she intended to emphasize her legal experience by listing
"Esq." and her L.L.M in taxation on her business cards. 4 In
addition, she planned to describe her former tax practice in
various solicitations.65
56. A dual practitioner is a lawyer who delivers both legal and non-legal
services to clients. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Respon-
sibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
12272000]
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2. Discussion
The first issue is whether or not the rules of professional
conduct apply to attorney A's investment services practice.
The general rule is, "when a lawyer is providing both legal
and non-legal services to a client, all of the services are con-
sidered to be legal services for the purposes of determining
whether a lawyer must comply with the rules."6' To deter-
mine whether A is providing legal services, the Committee
considered whether her services "would constitute the prac-
tice of law if performed by a non-lawyer."'
Under the fact presented, A would be performing tradi-
tional legal services such as reviewing legal documents and
offering legal advice." It does not matter that the primary fo-
cus of her business would be non-legal investment advice, she
would still be bound by the rules of professional conduct."
Concluding that the rules of professional conduct apply to
A's practice, the Committee next considered whether "A's
communication of her professional designation as a lawyer
and her legal credentials" constitute communication regard-
ing legal services subject to Rule 1-400.7o Reasoning that the
66. Id. See Kelly v. State Bar, 789 P.2d 1026 (Cal. 1991); Layton v. State
Bar, 808 P.2d 808 (Cal. 1990).
67. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999); see also State Bar of California Comm. on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1995-141 (1995).
68. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999).
69. See id. This fact raises serious implications for A's non-legal practice.
For example, the Committee points out that A has a duty of confidentiality with
respect to all of the client's information. See id. "A cannot reasonably segregate
the information she acquires in the provisions of legal services and that which
she acquires in the provision of non-legal services; all information concerning
the client should be regarded as within the scope of Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e)." Id. A also owes her clients a duty of loyalty that will re-
quire her to refrain from representing adverse interests. See id.
70. Id. Rule 1-400 defines a communication as "any message or offer made
by or on behalf of a member concerning the availability for professional em-
ployment of a member or a law firm directed to any former, present, or prospec-
tive client." CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(A) (1999). The
rule prohibits communications that:
(1) Contain any untrue statement; or
(2) Contain any matter, or present or arrange any matter in a manner
or format which is false, deceptive, or which tends to confuse, deceive,
or mislead the public; or
(3) Omit to state any fact necessary to make the statements made, in
the light of circumstances under which they are made, not misleading
to the public; or
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definition of a communication is broad, including the use of
any "firm name, trade name, fictitious name, or other profes-
sional designation of such member or law firm,"" the Commit-
tee decided that:
[W]here A lists her qualifications or experience as a law-
yer in a communication for law-related professional serv-
ices such as investment advice, such use of legal creden-
tials is a "communication" within the meaning of rule
1-400 if a recipient of such materials could reasonably be-
lieve that A is offering legal services or investment advice
that involves legal judgment or considerations. 72
The Committee did not decide whether the use of legal cre-
dentials is actually a communication, because such a decision
would be highly fact specific. However, the potential that the
use of credentials will constitute a communication does exist:
[A] is a dual practitioner whose non-legal profession is
nevertheless law-related. When she seeks to attract cli-
ents by reference to her legal training and expertise, pro-
spective clients could reasonably be led to believe that
they will receive legal as well as non-legal services, or at a
minimum, advice based upon legal considerations. 3
Because A's use of her legal credentials may constitute a
communication, A's promotional activities may also constitute
solicitations subject to Rule 1-400 and increased regulation.74
The Committee last considered whether the fee paid to A
by a portfolio manager would be an impermissible division of
fees with a non-lawyer under Rule 1-320.7' The Committee
(4) Fail to indicate clearly, expressly, or by context, that is a communi-
cation or solicitation, as the case may be; or
(5) Be transmitted in any manner which involves intrusion, coercion,
duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, or vexatious or harassing
conduct.
(6) State that member is a "certified specialist" unless the member hold
a current certificate as a specialist issued by the Board of Legal Spe-
cialization, or any other entity accredited by the State Bar to designate
specialists pursuant to standards adopted by the Board of Governors,
and state the complete name of the entity which granted certification.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(D) (1999).
71. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(A) (1999) (emphasis
added).
72. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id. Rule 1-320 provides that "neither a member or a law firm shall
12292000]
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characterized the percentage fee paid to A as "a commission-
like fee for introducing her clients to the primary investment
manager, "" yet this was not "sharing a legal fee."" The fee
paid to A was not in compensation for legal services or advice
and therefore, not prohibited."8 The fee arrangement did
"create in the lawyer a financial interest in the subject matter
of the representation"79 constituting a business transaction
with a client." Therefore, A must:
(1) make full disclosure in writing of all relevant circum-
stances surrounding the insurance referral arrangement
and all actual and reasonably foreseeable consequences to
the client from that arrangement ... (2) comply with all
requirements of rule 3-300, including obtaining the client's
written consent to the arrangement; and (3) ensure that
the attorney is able to completely advise the client under
the circumstances. 1
3. Conclusion
The bottom line is that it is very difficult for lawyers to
work as "dual practitioners." To the extent attorneys offer le-
gal advice they are bound by the rules of professional conduct,
including the duties of loyalty and confidentiality. To the ex-
tent they advertise by highlighting their legal credentials,
Rule 1-400 may apply. Finally, the rules against fee division
make it nearly impossible to form partnerships with non-
directly or indirectly share legal fees with a person who is not a lawyer." CAL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rulel-320(A). The rule also gives a list of
exceptions that the Committee does not find relevant. See State Bar of Califor-
nia Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-154
(1999).
76. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999).
77. Id.
78. See id. Two situations that would constitute an impermissible division
of fees are: (1) where A is paid a fee by a client for professional services includ-
ing legal advice and then shares that fee with a non-lawyer investment man-
ager; and (2) if A and the investment manager are partners in a single practice
that offers both legal and non-legal services. See id.
79. Id. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310(B)(4)
(1999).
80. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999); see also CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3-300 (1999).
81. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Formal Op. 1999-154 (1999) (citing State Bar of California Comm. on Pro-
fessional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1995-140 (1995)).
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lawyers.
C. Regulation of Attorney Web Sites: Interim Opinion
96-001482
The discussion of attorney advertising in Formal Opinion
1999-154 is related to another prominent issue: the use of at-
torney web sites. The emerging technology of the Internet
provides a new medium of communication and new possibili-
ties for lawyers to reach out to potential clients.83 Both the
ABA and state ethics committees have struggled to figure out
just what an attorney's web site is, how to classify it, and how
to regulate it if at all.84
California has joined the states that have considered the
issue and has taken the first step toward making a decision
that the rules of professional conduct govern attorney web
sites.8" In Interim Opinion 96-0014, the Committee suggests
that a web site providing information to the public about the
attorney's availability for professional employment is a com-
munication governed by the rules of professional conduct, but
is not a solicitation. 6
1. Facts
Attorney A was a part of a law firm in private practice
82. State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility
and Conduct, Interim Opinion 96-0014 (1999) (visited Jan. 31, 2000)
<http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cp9903a.htm>.
83. See id.
84. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, A Re-Examination of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Pertaining to Client Development in Light of
Emerging Technologies: A White Paper Presented for the Purposes of Discussion
(visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/legalserv/advertising.html>. The
range of questions at issue with attorney web sites is mind-boggling. As the
ABA's White Paper discusses, decision makers must consider constitutional re-
strictions on regulation of commercial speech (which means that a regulating
body must first decide whether a web site is commercial speech); the construc-
tion of the Internet (domain names, "meta tags," HTML language, etc.); false
and misleading information; direct communication with clients; and a myriad
other issues. See id.
85. See id. According to the ABA's White Paper, as of 1998 20 states had
considered the scope of applicability of ethics rules to the Internet. See id. In
fact, "there have been no opinions indicating the rules are inapplicable, so it
may be assumed that a lawyer's use of the Internet invokes a requirement to
comply with all ethics rules governing advertising and solicitation." Id.
86. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Interim Op. 96-0014 (1999).
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that maintained a web site.87 The site described of the firm,
the education and professional background of the attorneys in
the firm, contained law related images, and allowed e-mail
access to any lawyer in the firm.88 The web site did not in-
clude any live video, bulletin boards, links to law-related
sites, or newsgroup functions.8
2. Discussion
The Committee first resolved that A's Internet web site is
a communication within the definition of Rule 1-400.'o Ac-
cording to the Committee, "The web site fits within the scope
of Rule 1-400(A) because it concerns the firm's availability for
professional employment; the web site is directed to the gen-
eral public." 1 Because the web site fits into the definition of a
communication it must comply with the rules governing at-
torney communications."
According to 1-400(D), a communication may not contain
any false or misleading information. 3 The Committee did not
elaborate on what would constitute false or misleading infor-
mation but the ABA's white paper 4 extensively considered
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. Rule 1-400 states:
For the purposes of this rule, "communication" means any message or
offer made by or on behalf of a member concerning the availability for
professional employment of a member of a law firm directed to any
former, present, or prospective client, including but not limited to the
following:
(1) Any use of firm name, trade name, fictitious name, or other pro-
fessional designation of such member or law firm; or
(2) Any stationery, letterhead, business card, sign, brochure, or
other comparable written material describing such member, law
firm, or lawyers; or
(3) Any advertisement (regardless of medium) of such member of
law firm to the general public or any substantial portion thereof; or
(4) Any unsolicited correspondence from a member of law firm di-
rected to any person or entity.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(A) (1999).
91. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Interim Op. 96-0014 (1999).
92. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(D)-(F) (1999).
93. See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(D) (1999).
94. The ABA's Commission on Advertising prepared the White Paper for the
purpose of discussing the effect emerging technologies have on the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84. Al-
though it does express ABA policy, it also highlights areas that need further
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several aspects of web sites that may cause problems. Under
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct a lawyer may
not use terms that "create an unjustified expectation about
results the lawyer can achieve."95 Thus, attorneys are pre-
cluded from using words such as "full service" or "complete
legal services. '  Further, attorneys are not allowed to make
comparisons to other attorneys' services unless the compari-
son can be factually substantiated.97 Thus, web sites could
not contain the words "best lawyers," "highly qualified," or
",expert."8
The concerns about attorney web sites extend beyond the
text on that site. For example, pictures may be considered to
be false and misleading.99 Domain names, URLs and e-mail
addresses may also cause problems.' ° For example, an e-mail
address such as "neverlost a case@abc.com" or
"bigmoney4 U@xyz.com" could violate rules of professional
conduct.' Further, the way a web site is constructed may
cause problems."0 A web site is generally registered with a
search engine, and site creators have methods that can en-
sure priority placement with those search engines ("and as
with yellow pages, a lawyer with a home page that appears at
the beginning of the list from a search engine's search has a
competitive advantage.") 3 Search engines work by identify-
ing the words "that appear in the html language used to code
the contents of the site."0 4 If a web site repeatedly uses cer-
tain words and phrases it is more likely that site will be listed
consideration. See id.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1(b) (1983).
96. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84.
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1(d) (1983).
98. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84.
99. For example, an illustration may display a map or a globe that would be
appropriate for a firm practicing international law but not for other practice ar-
eas, or a web site may have a picture with an attorney in a courtroom, which
might not be appropriate for an attorney without courtroom experience. See id.;
see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6158 (West 1998) (noting that the message
of electronic media "means the effect in combination of the spoken word, sound,
background, action, symbols, visual image, or any other technique employed to
create the message").
100. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84; Arthur Garwin, Com-
mentary on Domain Names, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 64.
101. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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near the top of any resulting search.'
Beyond being concerned about the content of their own
web sites, attorneys must also be careful of the links they
provide to other web sites. '°6 Links allow an attorney to direct
a client to other web sites of interest. The question remains
open as to whether the attorney is responsible for the content
of those linked sites. On the one hand, "[i]f a lawyer is re-
sponsible for the content of the links, the burden of review be-
comes enormous, which in turn limits the lawyer's ability to
link to other sites."Y67 On the other hand, "[if a lawyer is not
responsible for the content of links, lawyers would be able to
provide their potential clients with information, through the
links, that would be impermissible for them to do directly."' 8
Although the Committee found that attorney web sites
are communications, calling into question the above scenar-
ios, it was not convinced that web sites are solicitations under
Rule 1-400.1"9 A solicitation can either be (1) delivered in per-
son or by telephone, or (2) "directed by any means to a person
105. See id. These words and phrases can appear in the HTML language in
several ways. First, the text of the site may itself contain words and phrases.
See id. Second, the words and phrases can be embedded into "meta tags," which
are inserted to the coded HTML language and are not visible on the web page.
See id. Third, words and phrases can be placed on a site in the same color as
the background making them invisible. See id. No matter where these words
and phrases are placed, if they are out of context with the lawyer's practice but
instead designed to ensure priority placement with a search engine, the web site
may be considered false and misleading. See id.
106. The Committee did not reach this question in its proposed opinion. See
State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, In-
terim Op. 96-0014 (1999).
107. ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84.
108. Id. For example, an attorney may provide a link to a client's web page
where the client wrote "we've worked with lots of law firms, but none have dem-
onstrated the quality of Smith & Doe." Id. Had the attorney provided this
statement on its own web site, it would violate Model Rule 7.1. See id.
109. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Interim Op. 96-0014 (1999). Rule 1-400(B) defines a solicitation as
follows:
For purposes of this rule, a "solicitation" means any communication:
(1) Concerning the availability for professional employment of a
member or a law firm in which a significant motive is pecuniary
gain; and
(2) Which is;
(a) delivered in person or by telephone, or
(b) directed by any means to a person known to the sender to
be represented by counsel in a matter which is a subject of the
communication.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(B) (1999).
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known to the sender to be represented by counsel in a matter
that is a subject of the communication."1 ' Web sites do not
meet either of these requirements."' Although e-mail is
transmitted through telephone wires, the Committee "doles]
not believe that e-mail creates the risk of undue influence
against which [Rule 1-400(B)(2)(a)] is designed to guard.""12
Further, web sites are not directed to any one in particular
and the attorney does not initiate the communication."'
The last issue the Committee addressed was interstate
communication. The rules of professional conduct and the
above concerns apply equally to foreign attorneys in their
communications made in California concerning their avail-
ability to perform legal services in California."1 4 The Commit-
tee also warned that California attorneys advertising in other
jurisdictions must comply with the rules of those jurisdic-
tions."' In fact, an attorney "must recognize the possibility
that the advertising rules of other jurisdictions may apply to
her Internet web site even if she is licensed only by California
and intends to practice only in California.""6 Although attor-
neys may attempt to avoid regulation in other states,117 such
110. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(B)(2) (1999).
111. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Interim Op. 96-0014 (1999).
112. Id. E-mail allows a potential for the recipient to read and reflect on the
message. See id.
113. See id. In order to be considered a solicitation, the attorney must initi-
ate the communication. See id.
114. See id. Rule 1-100(D)(2) states:
As to lawyers from other jurisdictions who are not members: These
rules shall also govern the activities of lawyers while engaged in the
performance of lawyer functions in this state; but nothing contained in
these rules shall be deemed to authorize the performance of such func-
tions by such persons in this state except as otherwise permitted by
law.
CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-100(D)(2) (1999).
115. See State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Interim Op. 96-0014 (1999). For example, in Pennsylvania an ethics
opinion was issued that "a lawyer may not advertise that he or she is 'compe-
tent,' 'sympathetic,' or 'caring."' ABA Comm'n on Advertising, supra note 84.
116. State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Con-
duct, Interim Op. 96-0014 (1999).
117. See id. The Committee recommends that attorneys add to their web
site,
an explanation of where the attorney is licensed to practice law; a de-
scription of where the attorney maintains law officers and actually
practices law; an explanation of any limitation on the courts in which
the attorney is willing to appear; a statement that the attorney does
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efforts may not always be enough." 8
3. Conclusion
The full extent to which various aspects of attorney web
sites implicate the rules of professional conduct remains un-
decided. However, it is clear that the Committee has ex-
tended the rules to encompass attorney web sites and new
technologies. Further, attorneys with web sites must not only
ensure compliance with California rules but also with the
rules of any other jurisdictions that may apply to that web
site.
IV. CALIFORNIA STATE COURT DECISIONS
In addition to the Committee's ethics decisions, state
courts sometimes issue decisions that govern attorney con-
duct. This year the California courts have vindicated several
aspects of the State Bar's regulation of attorneys and have ex-
tended the disqualification rules.
A. The Conflict of Interest of an "Of Counsel"
The rule in California is clear that "when a conflict of in-
terest requires an attorney's disqualification from a matter,
the disqualification extends vicariously to the attorney's en-
tire law firm.""' 9 In People v. Speedee Oil Change Systems,
Inc. 120 the California Supreme Court had occasion to consider
whether the same rule applies to an attorney who is "of coun-
sel" to the law firm. The court concluded that the per se rule
of disqualification of an entire law firm when one attorney
has a conflict of interest applies with equal force when that
attorney is "of counsel." 2'
1. Facts
The California Attorney General sued Speedee Oil on be-
half of the Department of Corporations alleging violations of
not seek to represent anyone based solely on a visit to the attorney's
web site.
Id.
118. See id.
119. People v. Speedee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 374 (Cal. 1999).
120. Id.
121. See id.
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the California Franchise Investment Act. 122 Speedee franchi-
sees, including the respondent, intervened in the action and
brought in Mobil Oil Corporation as a defendant in interven-
tion.123  Attorney Geordan Goebel had represented the re-
spondent franchise many times but because of the complex
nature of the action he associated the law firm of Shapiro,
Rosenfeld & Close as attorneys of record. 14 Attorney Eliot
Disner was "of counsel" to the Shapiro firm and was listed on
its letterhead.
12
'
The law firm of Cohon and Gardner represented Mobil in
the action. 26 After conducting an initial check for conflicts
and verifying that Disner knew nothing about the case, attor-
ney Jeffrey Cohon called Disner and, "in a conversation Co-
hon believed was confidential, he and Disner discussed the
case's substantive allegations, its procedural status and Mo-
bil's theories.' 1 27 The two attorneys then met and further dis-
cussed the case.' At this meeting Disner gave Cohon a copy
of his resume and business card that both "prominently fea-
tured the Shapiro firm's name and address.' ' 29 At the end of
this meeting, Disner agreed to do some legal research and
then conveyed the results to Cohon.' °
When Gardner received notice of the Shapiro firm's asso-
ciation, he notified Disner his services were not needed and
then notified Shapiro that he objected to its participation in
the case on behalf of the franchise.' Mobil filed a motion to
disqualify the Shapiro firm arguing that Disner, and thus the
Shapiro firm, had acquired confidential information concern-
ing the case. In opposition, both Disner and Shapiro filed
declarations swearing they had not discussed the case with
each other, nor did either know of the other's participation in
the case. 32 The trial court denied the motion and the court of
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Speedee Oil Change Sys., 980 P.2d at 374.
126. See id. at 375.
127. Id. When Cohon called Disner, "the receptionist answered the tele-
phone, 'Shapiro, Rosenfeld and Close."' Id.
128. See id. At the meeting, they discussed the background of the case, Mo-
bil's theories and discovery strategy, as well as specific factual issues. See id.
129. Id. at 375.
130. See id.
131. See Speedee Oil Change Sys., 980 P.2d at 375.
132. See id. at 376.
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appeal affirmed.13
2. Discussion
The heart of the California Supreme Court's decision lay
in its characterization of the relationship between Disner, an
attorney "of counsel," and the Shapiro law firm. The right of
a court to disqualify an attorney is based on "the paramount
concern ... to preserve the public trust in the scrupulous ad-
ministration of justice and integrity of the bar."'3 4 The court
easily concluded that for the purposes of conflict of interest,
Disner represented Mobil.'35 The true question is whether the
relationship between a law firm and its "of counsel" attorney
is close enough to require the entire firm's disqualification.
In order to be considered "of counsel," the firm must have
a relationship with an attorney that is "close, personal, con-
tinuous, and regular.' ' 36 In fact, "the essence of the relation-
ship between a firm and an attorney of counsel to the firm 'is
the closeness of the 'counsel' they share on client matters.' 137
As long as the relationship between Disner and the Shapiro
firm was close enough for Disner to be held out as "of coun-
sel," then "the principal and 'of counsel' relationship must be
considered a single, de facto firm for the purposes of Rule
3-3 10. 138
133. See id. The appellate court based its decision on the fact that "the trial
court impliedly concluded Mr. Disner practiced law separate and apart from
[the Shapiro firm] except on those few annual occasions when Mr. Disner or [the
Shapiro firm] associated the other on a particular case." Id.
134. Id. at 378. The court added, "Ultimately, disqualification motions in-
volve a conflict between the clients' right to counsel of their choice and the need
to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility .... The important
right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect
the fundamental principles of our judicial process." Id.
135. See id. at 383. The court found that Disner represented Mobil for con-
flict purposes because he knowingly obtained confidential information and acted
on that information to provide Cohon with legal research. See id. at 382.
136. Id. at 383 n.6.; CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400(E)
(1999).
137. Speedee Oil Change Sys., 980 P.2d at 383 (citing State Bar of California
Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1993-129
(1993)).
138. Id. at 384 (citing State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Respon-
sibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1993-129 (1993)). The ABA takes the same
position. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 90-357(1997).
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3. Conclusion
In determining that the disqualification of an attorney "of
counsel" extends to the attorney's firm, the court left open the
question of whether effective screening procedures can avoid
disqualification." 9 Justice Mosk addressed this issue in his
concurrence and concluded that since the disqualification is
automatic, "ethical screens" should make no difference.'4°
This case confirms the trend towards increased scrutiny of at-
torneys' actions demonstrates California courts' commitment
to high ethical standards.
B. The Constitutionality of Continuing Education
Requirements
While in Speedee Oil the California Supreme Court dis-
cussed how the rules of professional conduct protect the in-
terests of justice, in Warden v. State Bar of California' it
emphasized the rules' function as a consumer protection
measure. In this case the court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the mandatory continuing legal education
("MCLE") program and found that it did not violate equal
protection principles.4
1. Facts
Attorney Lew Warden is member of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia.' 3 Warden did not comply with the MCLE require-
ments so the State Bar sent him a letter warning that he had
sixty days to comply or it would enroll him as an inactive
member of the Bar. 4 4 When Warden took no action, the State
Bar advised him that it would submit his name to the Board
of Governors with a recommendation that he be enrolled as
an inactive member.'45 Warden sent a letter to the State Bar
asserting that the MCLE program is unconstitutional and
that he could not be prohibited from practicing law for refus-
ing to comply with its requirements.'46 Warden was enrolled
139. See Speedee Oil Change Sys., 980 P.2d at 382.
140. See id. at 386.
141. Warden v. State Bar, 982 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1999).
142. See id. at 156.
143. See id. at 159.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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as an inactive member and brought suit alleging that by ex-
empting certain categories of attorneys from the MCLE re-
quirements the program violated his constitutional rights.47
The trial court granted a summary adjudication in favor of
the Bar on all issues. 14  The appellate court reversed, con-
cluding that three of the exemptions could not be sustained
under the rational relationship equal protection standard, but
it could not agree on a remedy. 149
2. Discussion
The MCLE program required attorneys to complete
thirty-six hours of legal education within a thirty-six month
period. ° Certain categories of attorneys are exempted from
this requirement, including retired judges, officers and
elected officials of the State of California, and full-time pro-
fessors at accredited law schools.'51
Using a rational relationship standard, '52 the court held
that, "although it may be that the wisdom of some or all of
147. See Warden, 982 P.2d at 160.
148. See id at 160-61.
149. See id. Two justices argued that the appropriate remedy is to invalidate
the whole program, while the one remaining justice argued that only the uncon-
stitutional exemptions need be invalidated. See id.
150. See id.; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6070 (West 1998). Four of
those MCLE hours must be in legal ethics. See id.
151. See Warden, 982 P.2d at 156. The State Bar is currently considering an
amendment to this rule to reduce the number of hours required and eliminate
the categorical exemption for retired judges. See State Bar of California, Home
Page (visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.calbar.org/2cer/mclerev.htm>.
152. Warden argued that the right to "engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life" is a fundamental right. Warden, 982 P.2d at 162; see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Conway v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 657 (Cal.
1989); Yakov v. Board of Med. Examiners, 435 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1968). However,
the court rejected this argument relying on Bib'le v. Committee of Bar Examin-
ers, which held that the rational relationship is applied in cases involving occu-
pational licensing. See Warden, 982 P.2d at 163.
Justice Kennard dissented, arguing that the rational basis standard of re-
view is not properly applied when the equal protection challenge is to a court
rule. See id at 170 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The rational relationship stan-
dard is used to allow deference to a co-equal branch of government, but in this
case the MCLE program was established pursuant to a court rule and the court
owes itself "no particular deference." Id.
Justice Brown also dissented, noting that California follows a different set
of standards than the federal government. See id. at 175 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brown felt the court should undertake a "genuine judicial inquiry
into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals," by
"asking whether the legislative classifications substantially advance the legisla-
tive purposes without being 'grossly overinclusive' or 'underinclusive."' Id.
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these exemptions is debatable as a matter of policy," there are
plausible reasons that rationally support the exemptions.
The rationale for these exemptions could be that the above
categories of attorneys are less likely to represent clients on a
full-time basis and that by virtue of their jobs they are more
likely to be familiar with recent legal developments.
It is of little surprise that the court upheld the MCLE re-
quirement, given the court's emphasis on the program's con-
sumer protection purpose:
The aim of continuing legal education is to provide con-
tinuing assurance to the public that all California attor-
neys, no matter how many years may have passed since
their law school graduation and State Bar admission, have
the knowledge and the skills to provide their clients with
high quality legal services.
155
Under the court's rationale, just because the program is im-
perfect is no reason to invalidate a "consumer protection
measure 'intended to enhance the competency of attorneys
practicing law in this state."'156
3. Conclusion
Currently forty states, including California, have adopted
MCLE requirements.57  Although the ABA recommends
against any exemptions,"8 the California Legislature, State
Bar and Supreme Court have seen fit to excuse certain
classes of attorneys from the MCLE program. This case reaf-
firms the steps California's governing bodies have taken to
ensure ethical and competent representation by attorneys.
153. Warden, 982 P.2d at 165.
154. See id. Justice Kennard rejected these contentions in his dissent. He
noted that those who represent clients on a part-time basis are more likely to
need continuing education and less likely to be abreast of legal developments.
See id. at 172. At the same time, clients of part-time practitioners are just as
vulnerable to the damage caused by malpractice as those represented by full-
time attorneys. See id. Justice Kennard also rejected the majority's second ra-
tionale. See id. at 173.
155. Id. at 171.
156. Id. at 157.
157. See id. at 157 n.1.
158. See id. at 165 n.10.
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C. The First Amendment and the State Bar's Political
Activities
In the short opinion of Morrow v. State Bar of Califor-
nia,'59 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that compul-
sory membership in the State Bar does not violate attorneys'
First Amendment rights.
1. Facts
Bill Morrow, representative of California's 73rd assembly
district; Barry Keene, former state senator; and J. Bruce
Henderson, former member of the San Diego County Council,
sued to enjoin the State Bar from engaging in political activi-
ties that are not germane to its regulatory functions. 6 ' Be-
cause the plaintiffs were not complaining of the way the State
Bar spends their mandatory dues, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim.'
2. Discussion
The heart of the plaintiffs' claim was that "by virtue of
their mandatory State Bar membership, [the plaintiffs] are
associated in the public eye with viewpoints they do not in
fact hold," which violates their First Amendment rights of
free association.'62 The California Supreme Court had previ-
ously held that the State Bar could not spend an attorney's
mandatory dues on activities that were ideological in nature
and not related to regulating the legal profession.' However,
the court held that membership alone does not violate the
plaintiffs' rights since they are not forced to espouse any par-
ticular view nor are they prohibited from expressing their
own views.'64
3. Conclusion
The State may compel lawyers to join the State Bar and
pay dues as long as members can receive refunds of the por-
tion of their dues spent on political activities unrelated to the
159. Morrow v. State Bar, 188 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1999).
160. See id. at 1175.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S.
820 (1961).
164. See Morrow, 188 F.3d at 1177.
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Bar's regulatory function.
V. THE ACTIVITY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
While California regulators have been expanding the
reach of the rules of professional conduct, this year has been a
year of change for the ABA. In 1999 the ABA addressed newt , • 16516
technologies, confronted new ways to deliver legal services '
and considered a revision of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.'67
A. Ethics 2000
"Ethics 2000" is the thirteen-member Commission on the
Evaluation of Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commis-
sion").'68 The Model Rules have not been revised since 1983
and despite the fact that they "have proven to reflect, in the
main, an effective approach to the resolution of many ethical
issues that could serve the profession well into the next cen-
tury," they would "benefit . . . from a comprehensive study
and review at this time."'69 The Commission is considering a
wide variety of issues including:
variations in the Rules as they have been adopted by the
states; areas of inconsistency or dissonance from Rule to
Rule or Rule to Comment; the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers; new forms of
technology; public perceptions; multi-city law firms; and
the growth of specialized practice areas.170
In many ways, Ethics 2000 is easing restrictions on law-
yers. Several small examples illustrate the point. Ethics
165. See infra Part V.B.1.
166. See supra Part III.B.
167. See infra Part V.A.
168. See ABA Comm'n on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Ethics 2000 Home Page (visited Apr. 11, 1999)
<http://www/abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html>. The Commission is charged with:
(1) conducting a comprehensive study and evaluation of the ethical and
professionalism precepts of the legal profession; (2) examining and
evaluating the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the rules
governing professional conduct in the state and federal jurisdictions; (3)
conducting original research, surveys and hearings; and (4) formulating
recommendations for action.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Ethics 2000 Advisory Council, Ethics 2000 Advisory Council Information
(visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/advisory.html>.
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2000 is considering allowing attorneys to use the phrases
"best practice" or "excellence in practice" as aspirational
statements in advertising. 7' It is also considering revising
the Rules to allow lawyers to accept reasonable directions
from third-party payers, i.e., those who pay for another's rep-
resentation.'72 It is considering eliminating automatic impu-
tation of personal interest conflicts. "3 Although many of the
proposed changes to some extent relax the regulation of at-
torneys, lawyers should be aware that there are many pro-
posals that would strengthen those regulations.'74 The Com-
mittees full report is expected this year, but an overview of
which rules it might change is available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wkpliss.html.'
B. Decisions of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility
The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility issued three formal opinions in 1999.
The Committee interprets the ABA's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which govern attorneys. Although these
opinions are not binding, the indicate how the rules may af-
fect attorneys and their activities.
1. Protecting the Confidentiality of Unencrypted E-Mail:
Formal Opinion 99-413176
Transmitting information relating to the representation
of a client by unencrypted e-mail over the Internet does not
violate Model Rule 1.6."' Internet e-mail "affords a reason-
able expectation of privacy from a technological and legal
171. See id. Such statements would normally be seen as false and mislead-
ing. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983).
172. See Ethics 2000, Proposed Work Plan (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wkpliss.html>; see also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1983).
173. See Ethics 2000, Proposed Work Plan (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpt/wkpliss.html>; see also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(i) (1983).
174. See Ethics 2000, Proposed Work Plan (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http://www/abanet.org/cpr/wkpliss.html>.
175. See id.
176. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
99-413 (1999).
177. See id. The full text of this opinion is available at <http://www/abanet.
org/cpr/fo99-413.html>.
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standpoint.' 7 8 However, an attorney should discuss the issue
with her clients and follow the client's instructions on how to
transmit sensitive information.'79
2. Ethical Obligations When a Lawyer Changes Firms:
Formal Opinion 99-414...
When a lawyer leaves one firm to join another, both she
and the "responsible members of the firm who remain" must
take reasonable measures to assure that the withdrawal does
not cause any material adverse effects to the interests of cli-
ents with whom the lawyer is currently working.' Further,
those attorneys have an ethical obligation to notify the clients
and protect the clients' files, information and property.'82 Fi-
nally, the departing lawyer is ethically prohibited from mak-
ing in-person contact with any client with whom she has no
family or attorney-client relationship prior to her departure.
Once the attorney leaves the firm, she may contact any client
in writing.8 1
3. Representation Adverse to an Organization by a
Former In-House Counsel: Formal Opinion 99-415185
Neither a former in-house lawyer nor his new firm may
represent an interest adverse to the lawyer's former employer
in the same or a substantially related matter without the
former employer's consent when the lawyer has personally
represented his former employer. 8 ' Further, if the former in-
house lawyer gained protected information concerning the
matter he will be disqualified and the disqualification will be
imputed to the whole firm.
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C. New Ethics Rule on Political Contributions
Just in time for the 2000 election the ABA has voted to
adopt a new model rule by a vote of 266 to 157.188 The new
rule reads: "A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a govern-
ment legal engagement or appointment by a judge if the law-
yer or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits po-
litical contributions for the purpose of obtaining or being
considered for that type of legal engagement or appoint-
ment.""9
This rule, which was rejected last August, was endorsed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Ar-
thur Levitt who urged House of Delegates members, "Lend
the integrity of your profession and the power of your prestige
to end pay for play."is° State legislators will now consider
whether to adopt this new rule. 9'
VI. CONCLUSION
The opinions and decisions issued this year by the Cali-
fornia State Bar, California State courts and the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity are not radical. However, the opinions highlight the
problems that state and national regulators deal with when
confronting new technologies and new ideas on how to prac-
tice law. Society is substantially different today from when
the above rules were drafted, and the different bar associa-
tions and courts are trying to meet society's emerging needs
with the same old rules. While the ABA is analyzing and re-
vising its Model Rules, the opinions of the California State
Bar and state courts seem to indicate that the trend in Cali-
fornia is to stretch the current ethical theories to cover more
and different aspects of an attorney's practice. While the
above sources are not exhaustive of the regulations affecting
lawyers in California, they nonetheless highlight the impor-
tance of paying attention to new developments in the area of
professional responsibility.
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